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In repeated games with public monitoring, the consideration of behav-
ior strategies makes relevant the distinction between public and private
strategies. Recently, Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and
Sekiguchi [7] have provided examples of games with equilibrium payoﬀs in
private strategies which lie outside the set of Public Perfect Equilibrium
payoﬀs. The present paper focuses on another distinction, that between
mixed and behavior strategies. It is shown that, as far as with mixed
strategies one is concerned, the restriction to public strategies is not a re-
striction at all. Our result provides a general explanation for the findings
of Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [7] as
well as a general method for constructing examples of that sort.
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Repeated Games with public monitoring are repeated games where, at the end
of each stage, players do not observe each others’ action, but only a public
outcome, which is stochastically related to those. Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
(henceforth, APS) [1] studied the set of pure-strategy (sequential) equilibrium
payoﬀ set of such games. Among other things, they showed that for any pure-
strategy equilibrium payoﬀ vector v, one can find a pure-strategy equilibrium
profile σ which supports v and which is public in that strategies in σ depend on
the publicly observed variable only. Hence, as far as with pure strategies one
is concerned, the distinction between public and private strategies (strategies
which, in addition, depend on the players’ private information) does not matter.
The dynamic programming method of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti can be
readily extended to study the equilibria associated to a special class of behavior
strategies, namely those that depend on the publicly observed variable alone (for
instance, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [4]). Such a set is typically referred
to as the set of Public Perfect Equilibria (PPE). However, as soon as behavior
strategies are introduced, the distinction between public and private strategies
becomes relevant. In fact, Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and
Sekiguchi [7] have recently provided examples of games with equilibrium payoﬀs
in private strategies which lie outside the set of PPE payoﬀs.
The present paper focuses on another distinction, that between mixed and
behavior strategies, which appears to be relevant for the class of games under
consideration. This point of view complements that of Kandori and Obara [5]
and Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [7] by showing that, as far as with mixed
strategies one is concerned, the restriction to public strategies is not a restric-
tion at all. Specifically, we show that if v is a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vector
supported by private behavior strategies, then there exists a Nash equilibrium
profile in public mixed strategies which supports v.
The main argument is based on Dalkey’s theorem (Dalkey [3]), which states
that in games with eﬀectively perfect recall it is immaterial whether or not
a player recalls his own past actions. Given a game with imperfect private
monitoring satisfying the same assumptions as in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
[1], we consider a game that diﬀers from the original one only in that players
do not recall their own past actions. By construction, in such a game all the
strategies are public strategies. After checking some measurability conditions,
we mimic Dalkey’s argument to show that this game and the original one have
the same Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. From this, our result about the
equivalence of public mixed strategies and private behavior strategies follows
at once. By construction, the new game we introduced does not have perfect
recall. As it is well-known, this implies that, generally speaking, its set of
Nash equilibrium payoﬀs in mixed strategies and that in behavior strategies
do not coincide. Hence, our result about the equivalence between this game
and the original one implies at once that the set of PPE payoﬀs and the set of
equilibrium payoﬀs in private behavior strategies do not coincide in the original
game. In this respect, our result provides a general explanation for the findings
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of Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [7] as well as a
general method for constructing examples of that sort.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
contains the proof of the equivalence stated above. Section 4 concludes by
observing that such equivalence does not extend beyond the model of section 2.
2 The Model
The model described below is essentially the same as in APS [1] with the as-
sumption about the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the stage
game removed. When other assumptions are weakened, or additional interpre-
tations proposed, a detailed discussion is given.
2.1 The Stage Game G
This is a finite-player game. Each player i ∈ I has a finite set of actions, Ai;
a ∈ A = ×iAi denotes a profile of pure actions. The payoﬀs in the game depend
on the action profile being played and on the realization ω ∈ Ω of a state of
the world. Such a state is randomly selected according to a measure µ(a) when
profile a is played. We assume
R1 Ω is a compact subset of a Polish space. (Ω,BΩ) is a measurable space,
with BΩ referring to the Borel σ-field.
R2 The measures {µ(a)}a∈A are mutually absolutely continuous. In particu-
lar, there exists a fixed measure µ such that µ(a) << µ, ∀a ∈ A.
Let gi(ω, a) be the payoﬀ that player i receives when a is played and ω
realized. We assume also,
P1 gi(·, a) is continuous in ω for every a ∈ A.
Note that R1-P1 imply bounded payoﬀs, that is ∃c ∈ R such that gi(·, ·) ∈
[−c, c].
To complete the description of the stage game, denote by mi a mixed action
for player i. The set of mixed profiles is ∆(A) = ×i∆(Ai), and a generic
element in ∆(A) is denoted by m. The family {µ(a)}a∈A is extended to a
family {µ(m)}m∈∆(A) in the obvious way. Finally, when profile m is played,
player i’s expected payoﬀ is
R
gi(ω,m)dµ(m) = E[gi(ω,m)].
By Nash, G has an equilibrium (in mixed strategies).
2.2 The Repeated Game G∞(δ) and the Signalling Struc-
ture
We denote by G∞(δ) the game consisting of the infinite repetition of G, where
all players discount their payoﬀs at the common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). The
signalling structure in G∞(δ) is described by the following assumptions
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S1 At the end of each stage t, t ∈ N , ω is realized and observed by all players.
S2 In each stage t, the distribution on Ω depends only on the (mixed) action
profile played in that stage. In other words, transition probabilities are
state-independent.
S3 At the end of each stage t, player i observes the payoﬀ he achieved in that
stage. However, as in APS, we assume that such a payoﬀ depends on the
actions a−i of player i’s opponents only indirectly through the eﬀect that
these actions have on the distributions on Ω.
The last assumption was introduced by APS in [1], and is recurrent in the
applied work on games with public information. It imposes that payoﬀs, though
observed, do not carry player i additional information other than that derived
from the realization of ω and the knowledge of (the realization of) his own action.
It might be worth noticing that this is a “global” assumption. Payoﬀs do not
carry additional information both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path. Because
of this, one can replace S3 by the following alternative assumption, which still
preserves the same information structure, but does not impose any restriction
on the technology of the payoﬀ functions.
S3’ Stage payoﬀs are unobservable.
Summarizing, the information that player i has at the beginning of stage
t consists of a t-vector ωt = (ω0,ω1, ...,ωt−1) of realizations of the publicly
observed state along with a t-vector ati = (ai,1, ..., ai,t−1) of realizations of his
own (mixed) actions.
2.3 Strategies
A pure-strategy for player i in G∞(δ) is a sequence of measurable maps σi =
{σi,t}∞0 , with σi,t : Ωt × At−1i −→ Ai. A mixed-strategy is a distribution over
pure strategies. A behavior-strategy for player i is a sequence of measurable
maps σi = {σi,t}∞0 , with σi,t : Ωt×At−1i −→ ∆(Ai). Ωt×At−1i is a measurable










, and ∆(Ai) has its
usual Borel structure. The set of player i’s pure strategies (mixed, behavior)
in G∞(δ) is denoted by Σi (Mi,Bi, respectively). Here, we have adopted the
convention of denoting by ·t the signal received after stage t is played. To ease
the notation, we have defined σi,0 on ω0 which is, clearly, arbitrary (similarly,
APS [1]). Such a choice has, obviously, no consequences for the analysis.
We conclude the section with the following
Definition 1 A strategy (pure or behavior) σi is said to be a public strategy
if for any ωt ∈ Ωt and any t ∈ N , σi,t(ωt, ati) = σi,t(ωt, a¯ti) for any pair
(ati, a¯
t
i) ∈ Ati ×Ati.
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3 Equivalence of Public Mixed-Strategies and
Private Behavior-Strategies
The following definitions and theorem are well-known (see, for instance, Mertens,
Sorin and Zamir [8]). They are included here for the ease of the reader.
Definition 2 A game is said to have (eﬀectively) perfect recall for player
i if player i (knowing the pure-strategy he is using) can deduce from any
signal he may get along some feasible play, the sequence of previous signals he
got along that play. A game is said to have (eﬀectively) perfect recall if it has
(eﬀectively) perfect recall for each player i ∈ I.
For games with eﬀectively perfect recall for player i, we have the following
important theorem due to Dalkey [3].
Theorem 3 (Dalkey [3]) In a game with eﬀectively perfect recall for player
i, player i’s pure-strategy set is the same (up to duplications) whether or not he
recalls his own past moves.
To prove the theorem ([8], p. 64), start by noticing that — as in Section 2.3
— a pure-strategy for player i has the form an = σ(ω0,ω1, ...,ωn−1; a1, ..., an−1),
ak ∈ Ai for each k. We want to define a new strategy, ζ, which does not
depend on (a1, ..., an−1). For each initial signal ω0, define a1 = σ(ω0) = ζ(ω0).
Proceed by defining a2 = σ(ω0,ω1; a1) = ζ(ω0,ω1; ζ(ω0)). Then, inductively, ζ
is defined. Finally, note that, whatever the other players’ strategy, ζ generates
the same probability distribution on plays as σ.
Now, let us return to our problem. Alongside with G∞(δ), let us introduce
a new game, G∞P (δ), which is such that players do not recall the realizations
of their own mixed actions, and is otherwise identical to G∞(δ). Observe that,
by construction, there are no private strategies in G∞P (δ). Though patently
artificial, this line of reasoning is useful to establish the desired equivalence by
means of Dalkey’s theorem.
Let VP be the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ set of G∞P (δ), and let V be that of
G∞(δ). Both sets are nonempty as the infinite repetition of the stage game
Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (the same) in both cases. We have,
Theorem 4 For the model described in Section 2,
V = VP
In particular, every v ∈ V can be obtained by public strategies.
Proof. Let σi be a pure-strategy in G∞(δ), and let ζi be defined as in the
proof of Dalkey’s theorem. We begin by establishing that ζi is indeed a sequence
of measurable maps.
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ζi is defined by means of the following composition









Ω0 ×Ω1 × · · · ×Ωt−1 ×A1 × · · · ×At−1 −→ −→ A
where
it is the identity on Ω0 ×Ω1 × · · · ×Ωt−1
πk : Ω0 × Ω1 × · · · × Ωt−1 −→ Ω0 × Ω1 × · · · × Ωk is the projection on the
first k + 1 factors
⊗ denotes tensor products





−→ (A,P(A)) ]. In fact, it and πk are measurable (product σ-
algebra). Hence, each ζi,k ◦ πk is Borel being the composition of Borel maps,
and so is ξ = it ⊗
µ
t−1
⊗ [ζi,k ◦ πk]
¶
being a tensor product of measurable maps.
Hence, ζi,t = σi,t◦ξ is measurable. In particular, ζi,t is
t×µ—measurable. In fact,
since Ω0×Ω1× · · · ×Ωt−1 is Polish, every Borel subset of Ω0×Ω1× · · · ×Ωt−1
is universally measurable.
Now, observe that ζi,1 is trivially measurable since ζi,1 = σi,1. Hence, by
induction, the proof is complete.
This shows that ζi is a feasible strategy inG∞(δ), and that any pure-strategy
profile in G∞(δ) can be replaced by a profile of pure strategies which (like our
ζi above) depend on the publicly observed variable only.
Next, observe that ζi is a strategy in G∞P (δ), and that any strategy in G∞P (δ)
is clearly feasible in G∞(δ). Hence, by combining these two observation, we can
conclude that G∞(δ) and G∞P (δ) have the same reduced normal form, and,
hence, the same Nash equilibrium payoﬀ set in mixed strategies. That is, V =
VP .
Finally, let v ∈ V be a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vector in G∞(δ), possi-
bly in private behavior strategies. By the preceding, there exists a profile of
mixed strategies in G∞P (δ) which supports v as a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vector.
Clearly, such a profile is a Nash equilibrium profile in G∞(δ) as well [because
G∞(δ) and G∞P (δ) have the same reduced normal form]. This completes the
proof.
The theorem says that, for the class of games described in Section 2, the
restriction to public strategies is not a restriction at all as long as one is willing
to trade private behavior strategies with public mixed strategies.
Now, we want to clarify the relation between our result and those of Kandori
and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [7]. To this end, we are
going to deal first with the case in which the following full-support assumption,
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originally introduced in APS [1] (used also in some of the examples of [5] and
[7]), is satisfied.
R3 Supp µ(a) = Ω, ∀a ∈ A.
In such a case, the set of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of G∞(δ) is the same as its
set of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoﬀs. Clearly, our conclusion that G∞(δ)
and G∞P (δ) have the same reduced normal form, and, hence, the same Nash
equilibrium payoﬀ set in mixed strategies is not aﬀected by the introduction of
R3.
Under R3, the set of PPE payoﬀs in G∞(δ) is the set of sequential equilibria
which depend on the public variable only. By our reasoning, it is immediate to
observe that such a set coincides with the set of behavior-strategy Nash equi-
librium payoﬀs in G∞P (δ). Now, let us focus on G∞P (δ). By construction G∞P (δ)
does not have perfect recall (because players do not recall their own actions).
Therefore, generally speaking (i.e., for arbitrary payoﬀ functions and discount
factors), the set of behavior-strategy Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of G∞P (δ) is a
proper subset of its set of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. The diﬀerence between the
two is given by those Nash equilibrium payoﬀs supported by mixed strategies
that cannot be supported by behavior strategies in G∞P (δ). By Theorem 4, such
equilibria still correspond to some equilibria in G∞(δ). The latter are exactly
those sequential equilibria in G∞(δ) which cannot be supported by public be-
havior strategies. In our terminology, this can be rephrased by saying that,
under R3, the examples of Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and
Sekiguchi [7] exploit exactly the fact that G∞P (δ) does not have perfect recall.
In other words, in order to construct such examples, it suﬃces to pick payoﬀs in
G∞(δ) in such a way that the set of behavior-strategy Nash equilibrium payoﬀs
of G∞P (δ) is a proper subset of its set of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. The equi-
librium payoﬀs in G∞P (δ) which are not behavior-strategy equilibria are exactly
those which lie outside the set of PPE payoﬀs in the original game G∞(δ).
The situation is slightly more complicated without the full support assump-
tion. To see this, suppose that v is a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ in G∞P (δ), and
assume that v is not a sequential equilibrium payoﬀ in G∞P (δ). By Theorem 4, v
is a Nash equilibrium in G∞(δ) as well. However, one cannot conclude that v is
not a sequential equilibrium payoﬀ in G∞(δ). In fact, while G∞(δ) and G∞P (δ)
have the same reduced normal form, the set of strategies in G∞(δ) is bigger
than the set of strategies in G∞P (δ). Hence, the set of players’ equilibrium be-
liefs in G∞(δ) is potentially bigger that the set of players equilibrium beliefs in
G∞P (δ). This opens the possibility that there is an equilibrium belief in G∞(δ)
(of course, associated to private behavior strategies) which makes v a sequential
equilibrium in G∞(δ). In fact, this is exactly what happens in the third exam-
ple of Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [7], where they exhibit a pure strategy
sequential equilibrium which cannot be replicated by public strategies. To be
sure, the (payoﬀ-) equivalent public-strategy profile still exists, but it cannot




In this paper, we have shown the equivalence, from the viewpoint of the Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs, between public mixed strategies and private behavior strate-
gies. In the proof, it was crucial for the use of Dalkey’s theorem that players’
information patterns in G∞(δ) and G∞P (δ) diﬀer only because of a player’s
knowledge of his own actions, a property that was delivered by either assump-
tion S3 or S3’ of Section 3.
To see that the equivalence result does not extend if either assumption is
removed, consider the following example1. Suppose that players are engaged in
a repeated Bertrand competition, that µ(a) = µ, ∀a ∈ A and that payoﬀs are
independent of ω, but assume that payoﬀs are observable. Suppose also that
the discount factor is suﬃciently high so that the monopolistic outcome is an
equilibrium outcome. Clearly, such an outcome emerges as an equilibrium only
because, by observing his per-period payoﬀ, a player can infer with certainty
whether or not the other players conformed to the monopolistic outcome. In
fact, it is supported by a profile where player i cooperates at t+ 1 if the other
did so at t, and reverts to the static Nash equilibrium if cooperation did not
take place at t. It is clear that such a profile cannot be replicated by any profile
in public strategies, since that would violate the measurability condition of a
player’s strategy with respect to his information. In other words, for the model
just described — where both S3 and S3’ are violated — the equivalence between
G∞(δ) and G∞P (δ) fails since we have at least one element in G∞(δ) that cannot
be obtained in G∞P (δ).
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